Face de-identification algorithms have been developed in response to the prevalent use of public video recordings and surveillance cameras. Here, we evaluated the success of identity masking in the context of monitoring drivers as they actively operate a motor vehicle. We compared the effectiveness of eight de-identification algorithms using human perceivers. The algorithms we tested included the personalized supervised bilinear regression method for Facial Action Transfer (FAT) [14] , the DMask method [19] , which renders a generic avatar face, and two edge-detection methods implemented with and without image polarity inversion (Canny, [20] , Scharr [21] ). We also used an Overmask approach that combined the FAT and Canny methods. We compared these identity masking methods to identification of an unmasked video of the driver. Human subjects were tested in a standard face recognition experiment in which they learned driver identities with a high resolution (studio-style) image, and were tested subsequently on their ability to recognize masked and unmasked videos of these individuals driving. All masking methods lowered identification accuracy substantially, relative to the unmasked video. The most successful methods, DMask and Canny, lowered human identification performance to near random. In all cases, identifications were made with stringent decision criteria indicating the subjects had low confidence in their decisions. We conclude that carefully tested de-identification approaches, used alone or in combination, can be an effective tool for protecting the privacy of individuals captured in videos. Future work should examine how the most effective methods fare in preserving facial action recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video recording technologies such as head-mounted devices (e.g., Google Glass), cloud-based video surveillance, body and dashboard cameras used by law enforcement agencies, and civilian drones have emerged in both private and public arenas. The widespread use of these technologies has raised concerns about the privacy of the individuals being recorded. These technologies have appeared in both public and private settings and are used often without the explicit awareness of the person being recorded. Consequently, deidentification algorithms have been developed in computer vision as a response to the increase in the use of these technologies. These algorithms typically have two objectives: 1.) to preserve the privacy of individuals being recorded by effectively masking their identity and 2.) to preserve the important information for which the recording was made.
Various algorithmic techniques have been employed in the de-identification of still frontal face images in optimal lighting conditions (e.g., ad-hoc distortion [1] , [2] and ksame [3] ). However, these techniques are limited in their ability to track and mask faces in dynamic video stimuli [4] . Recent work involving dynamic video stimuli has employed approaches that cover motion detection without the need for video decryption [5] , data hiding [6] , motion detection followed by obfuscation [7] , [8] , foveation [9] , singular value decomposition [10] , and full face/body de-identification using segment replacement [11] .
The continued challenge of these approaches is to maintain the integrity of the data being masked (e.g., expression/emotion/action preservation), while eliminating discriminating cues about specific identity. As such, the tradeoff between data preservation and de-identification has limited the effectiveness of dynamic facial masking techniques. Moreover, although high facial de-identification rates have been achieved, those rates never reach 100%.
A. Goals and Previous Work
The present study intends to address the question of de-identification without consideration of the problem of data preservation. We do this under the assumption that the latter cannot be fully and adequately addressed until the former is perfected. This study is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of identity masking algorithms, which we apply to the Second Strategic Highway Research Program's Naturalistic Driving Study (SHRP2-NDS) video dataset [13] . Notably, we use the human perceptual system as a standard of de-identification success. Specifically, we ask whether a human can recognize a face that has been masked with a de-identification algorithm.
The identity masking challenges posed by the SHRP2-NDS dataset are nearly unique in their scale and in the range of imaging conditions encompassed in the data. The SHRP2-NDS dataset includes approximately 2 petabytes of video footage from over 3, 100 drivers obtained over 2 years of observation. However, the dynamic video nature of the dataset provides for highly salient personally identifiable information about each of the drivers. This information must be eliminated to allow for distribution, examination, and analysis of the driving data by various institutions with research interests in the data. In particular, transportation researchers who have signed data usage licenses would benefit greatly from access to masked facial data, advancing the utility of the SHRP2-NDS to answer important scientific questions about driver behavior.
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Although much progress has been made in the field of identity-masking, the naturalistic nature of the SHRP2-NDS dataset poses difficult challenges to available deidentification algorithms. The dataset is characterized by extreme illumination conditions (e.g., illumination via transient headlights as a car turns and illumination via oncoming traffic, as well as night-time and day-time sunlight brightness conditions). There is also the problem of quick driver movements (e.g., head turns and other actions which are very common in real-world driving). Despite the challenges, the research opportunities afforded by a dataset of this quality are numerous and diverse. The need to make this dataset available to researchers has motivated these de-identification efforts and associated evaluations to assure masking success.
This work is a follow-up to a previous study [12] in which the effectiveness of both identity disruption and action preservation were measured using human evaluators. In that study [12] , de-identification success was examined for driver videos taken from a research-available test set (the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) Head Pose Validation, HPV dataset) modeled on the SHRP2-NDS data. Specifically, in [12] , the test was aimed at determining whether human subjects could recognize drivers whose faces were masked with one of two algorithms. The first algorithm was the "personalized supervised bilinear regression method for Facial Action Transfer (FAT)" [14] . The second algorithm was an alternative edge-masking method used to "fill-in" video frames in which the FAT mask failed to adequately track and mask a driver's face. Human performance accuracy was measured by the signal detection measure of d'.
The human experimental data showed that both of the algorithms substantially reduced the accuracy of human identification of drivers [12] . These findings are generally consistent with other studies that used non-human evaluation methods of de-identification and masking algorithms other than the FAT method and the edge-masking used by [12] (cf., [15] , [16] , [17] ).
Notably, the human performance data in [12] also indicated that both of the masking algorithms strongly lowered human confidence in recognition decisions made. Confidence was measured by examining C, a signal detection measure of response bias criterion. Specifically, both masking algorithms increased the likelihood that subjects would respond that they "did not recognize the driver". Thus, although neither algorithm was completely successful at eliminating the possibility of face identification by human perceivers, recognition judgments showed a high degree of uncertainty. This is an important result in that it suggests that if an identification were made by a human viewer, it would be made with very low confidence.
This previous work provides a starting point for evaluating identity masking success for the SHRP2-NDS dataset but leaves a number of important questions open for further exploration. First, in [12] , only two algorithms were evaluated.
Here, in addition to those tested previously, we consider six additional masking methods. This larger and more diverse set of de-identification algorithms offers a more comprehensive evaluation of possible approaches to de-identification for this challenging set of videos. Second, because we focused here only on the identity masking question, we used videos that limited or eliminated abrupt driver motions, which can occur in using a cell phone, checking rearview mirror, head turn, etc. This eliminated problems with finding and tracking faces in some algorithms, and assured us that the mask was correctly placed over the drivers' faces at all times. Therefore, identity masking failures could not be attributed to the mask being applied incorrectly to the face of the driver. Also, in [12] , the "studio style" training images shown to subjects included peripheral cues like hair and ears. Here, we eliminate these artifactual cues to assure that identification be based only on the internal face. In the present study, the contributions of the work are as follows:
• We provide the first comparison of of multiple masking methods for face de-identification, using humans as the standard of identification accuracy; • We control for identification based on factors other than the face, (e.g., hair style, ear shape, etc.); • We control for de-identification failures that might have occurred due to inaccurate applications of the mask to the face; • We present the first examination of the consistency of de-identification success across individual faces; • We offer empirical validation of the use of the human perceiver as an evaluator for the success of deidentification; and • We provide a useful replication of the results of previous study suggesting that single masking approaches might be combined to more effectively mask faces of different individuals.
II. EXPERIMENT
A. Methods 1) Dataset: As in [12] , we used the VTTI-generated Head Pose Validation (HPV) dataset of driver videos and still images for this test. This dataset was developed for research uses and does not have the same degree of privacy restrictions as the SHRP2-NDS video dataset. The HPV dataset was acquired using the same equipment as the SHRP2-NDS videos, and therefore uses comparable resolution, compression rates, and illumination [18] . By closely simulating the quality of the SHRP2-NDS data, the masking methods applied here are assumed to be applicable to the full range SHRP2-NDS stimuli. Moreover, the data we present here should generalize well to the full SHRP2-NDS dataset.
The HPV dataset includes 41 high-resolution, front-facing, color, still JPEG images on a black background that were tightly cropped around the face (Fig. 1 ). This cropping eliminated features such as ears, hair, and some face shape as identification cues. The original still image resolution for all drivers was 4320 × 3240 pixels. However, because the stimuli were cropped, variations between individual drivers' face width and height resulted in image sizes ranging from 1331 to 1984 pixels in width and 1324 to 2080 pixels in height. Note, however, that standardizing the width/height of the cropped images would have altered the quality of the images. Therefore, we left the original aspect ratios intact. The HPV dataset also includes low-resolution (384 × 259 pixels, 14.99FPS) videos of each driver actively driving a car or performing staged activities commonly performed while driving. Videos were shown either unmasked (face of the driver was not altered) or masked with one of 8 masking algorithms. In the latter case, the masks were applied to the face of the driver in the video (description of mask algorithms follows).
Each video segment was 5s long. The segments for each driver were identical between mask types to allow for more direct comparison of mask effectiveness between conditions. Because preservation of driving actions under different mask conditions (e.g., using a cell phone, checking rearview mirror, etc.) was not a critical research question in the current study, driver motions and actions were limited in these videos. This reduced movement assured that the drivers' faces were masked at all times. In other words, identity masking failures could not be attributed to the mask being applied incorrectly to the face of the driver.
2) Automated Identity Masking Algorithms: In addition to the FAT masking method used in [12] , here we examined the following additional masking conditions (Fig. 2 ).
• The DMask method [19] renders a generic avatar face over any face detected in the video. This is achieved by tracking and extracting eye gaze, face position, head position, eye and mouth movement, and facial features, in order to synthesize appropriate facial motion. • The Canny method [20] performs a set of operations designed to produce optimal edge detection, including applications of a Gaussian smoothing filter, a set of gradient-based edge detectors to enhance edges in the image, then a non-maximum suppression, threshold, and tracking to produce thin, refined edges. • The Scharr method [21] performs a more fundamental edge detection based on the Scharr operator, which filters the image to enhance edges and approximate the image gradient. • A combinatorial approach dubbed here the OverMask method was employed by overlaying the Canny and FAT methods.
• In addition, we used inverted color versions of the Canny, Scharr, and OverMask methods. As shown in Fig. 2 (Mask conditions) , the mask methods result in different image outputs with potential differences in physical perception for recognition. The implemented methods also differ in processing time, as shown in Table 1 which shows processing time using the default implementations with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-1620 v3 R 3.5GHZ with 64 GB RAM running the Windows 10 operating system. 3) Procedure: The experiment was composed of a study phase and a recognition phase. During the study phase, subjects studied one of two Study Lists (A and B) containing half of the high resolution drivers' still images. This Study List variable was used as a counterbalancing measure. Given the odd number of images, Study List A contained 20, and Study List B contained 21 images. The driver images in each Study List were presented in random order and were shown 4 times during the study phase. Each image was presented (each time) for 4 seconds. Images were presented in the center of the screen on a black background. There was a 2second delay between each image presentation. No responses were required from subjects during the training. Subjects were instructed to study the pictures and were made aware that they would be asked to recognize the faces in the second stage of the experiment.
The subsequent recognition phase was conducted immediately, during the same session with the subject with no significant time lapse. Subjects were assigned randomly to one of nine test conditions corresponding to the 8 mask types and an unmasked recognition condition. This latter served as a baseline for general recognition success on the challenging task of recognizing a person while driving after seeing a high-resolution image in the learning phase. Subjects were tested on the full set of 41 driver videos, with 20(21) old/familiar faces and 21 (20) new/unfamiliar trials, depending on study list. Each subject was tested with stimuli from one of the nine mask conditions (8 masked, 1 unmasked). Mask conditions were counterbalanced, such that across all subjects, all stimuli were seen equally often in each mask condition. All videos were presented in the center of the screen on a black background. On each trial, subjects were required to respond whether they recognized the driver in the video from the sequence of still images they had studied previously. Subjects indicated their response by clicking a "YES" option on the screen for an old identity (i.e., they recognized the driver in the video as familiar from the study phase) or by clicking "NEXT VIDEO" for a new identity (i.e., the driver was unfamiliar to them). Subjects could replay the videos as many times as they wished by pressing the SPACE button on the keyboard.
4) Testing Apparatus:
The experiment was conducted using Psychophysics Toolbox [22] , [23] , [24] in the MATLAB (v. R2014b) environment [25], thereby ensuring accurate stimulus presentation times. Stimuli were presented on 21.5 inch iMac systems.
5) Participants:
A total of 160 (125 female) undergraduate student volunteers (ages 18-47) from the University of Texas at Dallas participated in the study in exchange for research credit.
B. Results
As in [12] , Signal Detection Theory (SDT) was employed to measure human accuracy and decision making. The SDT model was formulated for each test trial as follows. Images presented in the recognition test were either seen previously (old) or were not seen previously (new). A hit was defined as a previously seen identity that was judged correctly to be old. A false alarm was a new identity incorrectly judged to be old. 1) Accuracy: Accuracy was assessed as d', which was calculated using the proportion of hits, p(hit), and the proportion of false alarms, p(f alse alarm):
where the z(.) is the z-transform.
Due to the non-linearity of d' for hit rates close to ceiling and false alarm rates close to floor performance, we used the Macmillan and Creelman [26] correction for p(hit) = 1 and p(f alse alarm) = 0. For those rates, the correction was applied as follows. If p(hit) == 1, then substitute p(hit) = 1 − 1/(2N h ), where N h is the number of trials in which an old identity was presented. Likewise, if p(f alse alarm) == 0, then substitute p(f alse alarm) = 1/ (2N f a ) , where N f a is the number of trials in which a new identity was presented. Table 2 and Fig. 3 show the average d' for each mask condition, including the Unmasked (UM) condition. An overview of these values shows that the faces in the unmasked condition were recognized well, and that recognition of faces in all of the mask conditions was impaired substantially. We examine the pattern of performance across conditions more formally in Section B3. 2) Response Bias: Response bias was measured using the signal detection criterion measure, C. C measures a subject's propensity to make a familiar versus unfamiliar response when they are uncertain. The criterion was computed as: C = −0.5 × [z(p(hit)) + z(p(f alse alarm))] 2 SEM is the standard error of the mean. This score is close to zero when subjects show no response bias; it is positive when "old/familiar" judgments are made conservatively; and it is negative when these judgments are made liberally. Table 3 and Fig. 4 report the average C for all conditions. An overview of these values indicates that subjects make all of their recognition judgments conservatively, even when the test stimulus was not masked. We examine the pattern of criteria across conditions more formally in Section B3. 
3) ANOVAs and SEM comparisons:
A two-factor Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the accuracy (d') data, using Mask Condition and Study List as independent variables. There was no effect of, or interaction with the Study List variable, and so we do not consider this variable further. The resulting one-factor model yielded a main effect of Mask Condition on d', F (8, 142) = 9.04, p < 0.001.
In comparing among the conditions, the SEM values indicate that the d' accuracy was significantly higher in the unmasked condition than the masked conditions. This indicates that all masks effectively impaired identification. Among the masked conditions, the OverMask and Inverted Scharr conditions produced significantly higher d's than the other masks indicating that they impaired identification less than the other masks. The Scharr, Inverted OverMask, DMask, FAT, Canny, and Inverted Canny conditions proved equally effective at impairing identification (see Figure 3 ). An analogous ANOVA was conducted for the response bias C. The resulting one-factor model yielded no significant main effects of Mask Condition on C, F (8, 142) = 1.79, p = 0.08 (see Figure 4 ). This indicates that response bias did not differ across mask conditions.
Hits and false alarm rates are shown in Fig. 5 . ANOVAs were calculated separately on hit and false alarm rates. For hit rates, there was a significant main effect of Mask Condition, F (8, 142) = 3.12, p = 0.003, with the Unmasked, Inverted Scharr, OverMask, and Inverted Canny conditions yielding the best hit rates. These conditions did not differ statistically from each other.
Notably, there was no hit rate advantage for the Unmasked condition over the masked conditions, suggesting that the accuracy advantage seen for the unmasked condition, as measured by d', was due to a lower false alarm rate for unmasked videos. This explanation was verified formally with an ANOVA on false alarm rate, which revealed a significant main effect of Mask Condition, F (8, 142) = 2.48, p = 0.015 and a false alarm advantage for the unmasked videos over the masked videos.
III. RESULTS SUMMARY
Face recognition accuracy was impaired for all conditions in which the face was masked, relative to the unmasked condition. The Inverted Scharr and OverMask conditions were the least effective masks. The remaining masks (Scharr, Inverted OverMask, DMask, FAT mask, Canny, and Inverted Canny) proved highly effective in impairing recognition. Dissecting recognition into hit and false alarm rates, it is clear that recognition from the unmasked face is highly accurate due to both a high hit rate and a low false alarm rate. Response bias was uniformly conservative and did not vary as a function of mask condition. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In the current study, our aim was to compare a variety of identity masking algorithms using human perception as the ultimate standard of recognition performance. We also addressed questions that remained following the work of [12] . First, we eliminated the possibility that recognition could be based on information other than the face. Specifically, we eliminated hair and ears as possible cues to identity.
Second, we tested subjects only on stimuli in which the mask was successful (i.e., eliminating short epochs in the video where the face tracking algorithm failed due to abrupt movements.) In the previous work [12] , natural movements of the drivers sometimes caused problems in tracking the face and thereby adhering the mask to the face. Filtering methods do not suffer from tracking failures and so are not limited by motions. Avatar based methods may be highly effective when the mask is properly placed, but ineffective when the mask misses the face center. Combination methods such as the Overmask, therefore, may be a good option when abrupt motions are likely.
Third, we expanded the number of identity masking algorithms, comparing eight methods based on diverse methods. Although all of the masks impaired identification substantially over the unmasked face, similar to the previous work of [12] , none of the masks completely eliminated identification. In addition, masking effectiveness, as measured via d' were observed between the algorithms tested, including algorithms that were simply direct inversions of other algorithms. These differences in the effectiveness of the algorithms may highlight the relative strength of different masks for different video challenges.
Fourth, our measure of confidence (C) was always above zero, indicating conservative response tendencies for every mask condition. This indicates that identification responses, in all cases, were made with weak confidence. Identifications made with weak confidence, especially by humans, are not usually accorded strong credibility. These results -combined with expected practices of data license agreements that specifically prohibit attempts to re-identify the drivers -make a strong case for the benefits of masking these data sets to improve data access for transportation studies.
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